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Introduction 
 
Late in the year 2002, two Canadian announcements dramatized key issues in the development of the new 
genomic marketplace.  In November, Canada’s Minister of Industry, whose department is responsible for much of the 
national government’s research expenditure, announced a “framework agreement” with the Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada.  In return for commitments of additional federal funds for research, university 
presidents had agreed to double the amount of research performed by universities and triple their “commercialization 
performance” by the year 2010.1   A few weeks later, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Harvard mouse or 
OncoMouse, the first genetically modified mammal to be patented in the United States, was not patentable subject 
matter in Canada.
2
  This ruling was greeted with consternation by at least some members of the biotechnology research 
community.  The president of the University of Toronto’s Innovations Foundation, the university’s “Technology 
Opportunity Company,”3 was quoted as saying:  “If you can’t patent it, you can’t make a company out of it, you just 
have to dump it into the public domain and you can’t get any investment.”4  
 
These two events are connected by the expanding private sector role in financing medical and life sciences 
research,
5,6
  and the role played by intellectual property (IP) protection in attracting the private funds that universities 
and hospitals now regard as indispensable.  Lost in much of the public debate about the Harvard mouse was the fact 
that E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. was entitled to an exclusive licence on the mouse as part of the deal that financed 
‘inventor’ Philip Leder’s appointment at Harvard.7    US federal policy and legislation, especially since the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, have facilitated and encouraged the emergence of a new era of commercially aggressive 
collaboration among universities, private industry and federal funding agencies.
8,9,10   
According to the best available 
estimates, public and non-profit funding for genomics research in the United States in the year 2000 amount to US 
$819.8 million, while private financing was estimated at over US $1 billion, probably between $1.5 billion and $2 
billion.
11 
 Comparable data are not available for Canada.  However, many national programs for financing research 
encourage, if they do not require, “partnerships” with the private sector.12  For example, Genome Canada – a 
foundation to which Industry Canada has committed C$300 million – requires that grant recipients obtain at least 
equivalent funding from their partners.  The Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI), to which C$3.1 billion has been 
committed, requires similar matching commitments in many of its funding programs, and is even more explicitly 
oriented toward commercial applications.   The Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the national health 
research granting council with a current annual budget of C$650 million, offers a variety of opportunities for industry 
co-sponsorship of training and salary awards as well as research operating grants.
13
  
  
In this paper, I use the term ‘biopatenting’ to describe the patenting of human biological materials such as cell 
lines, DNA sequences and the associated proteins, of innovations based on the information contained in human 
biological materials, and of processes that involve manipulating genetic material for commercial purposes.  Examples 
in this last category include the process components of the patent claims for the Harvard mouse, and stem cell 
processes related to the production of human tissues and organs in vitro.   I argue that discussions about sharing the 
benefits from genomics research, and specifically about biopatenting, must be explicitly linked to an ethical critique of 
what George Soros, ironically one of the richest men in the world, has called “market fundamentalism.”14   Soros’ 
concern is that market fundamentalism has enhanced the power of financial capital on a global scale in ways that may 
lead to the destabilization of national economies and international capital markets.  Mine is rather with how market 
norms and priorities are crowding out other values and vocabularies so that the value of research is judged by reference 
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to the likelihood of commercializable results.  At the same time, it has become extraordinarily difficult to challenge the 
linkage between bioscience and business in setting research directions.  Biopatenting policy represents a small, but 
important element in this larger scale transition. 
  
Questions of how the benefits from genomics research, and medical and life sciences research more 
generally, should be distributed can be considered on at least three levels.  The first level involves the claims of 
individuals whose tissues, or whose distinctive genetic characteristics, have been used in research that leads to 
commercial products.  The second level involves the claims of populations that have contributed to research that yields 
commercializable results, whether by providing actual biological materials or by making possible the detailed 
documentation of pedigrees.  The third level involves allocation of the benefits from research and its commercial 
products, independently from considerations of individual or group contribution to research, across national borders 
and boundaries of other kinds that are defined by race, gender, and especially economic situation.    
 
A number of thoughtful contributions to the literature have addressed ethical concerns related to benefit 
sharing at the first two levels,
15,16,17,18,19 
even though proposed solutions often have not been acted upon.   I concentrate 
here on the third level, to which less attention has been paid in recent discussions.  At this level, which involves 
engagement with various areas of public policy, an eclectic and transdisciplinary approach to ethical analysis is 
required.  Reflecting my own background in political theory and political economy, I concentrate here on issues 
related to distributive justice.  Others might take a different approach.   The generic methodological point is that 
responsible ethical analysis must not regard crucial background elements of the social and economic context – such as 
the expanding role for private financing of scientific research – as ‘too big to change’.  Instead such elements must be 
exposed to sustained critical analysis, of the kind bioethics now applies mostly to micro-level questions in the clinic or 
the laboratory.   
     
 
Biopatenting, distributive justice, and market fundamentalism 
   
Patents are now routinely issued on human genes and their protein products throughout the industrialized 
world, with patent protection often extending to include a broad range of uses for the identified gene, although it 
remains to be seen whether the broad claims in any number of recent biopatents will stand up to legal challenges.   
Similarly, genetically modified mammals are considered patentable subject matter in the United States and elsewhere 
in the industrialized world. 
20
   Patents have been issued, as well, on important process technologies such as those used 
in the ‘creation’ of the Harvard mouse and, at least in the United States, on human stem cells and methods of 
producing and using them.
21,22,23,24
  (The process claims in the Harvard mouse patent were never contested in Canada.)    
  
The standard defence of the current expansive approach to biopatenting runs as follows.   Private investment 
in research is essential because of the high costs involved in conducting therapeutically useful research, and in moving 
new research findings from the laboratory bench to the marketplace as useful diagnostic or therapeutic products.  
Investors demand strong intellectual property (IP) protection before they are willing to commit the necessary 
resources; indeed, a portfolio of patents may represent the principal asset of small and medium-sized firms.  Without 
that protection, investment will not flow into research and its commercialization.  The results will include not only a 
loss of jobs, scientific talent and (potentially) export revenues as investment flows to other jurisdictions, but also 
failure to realize the exciting health benefits associated with advances in bioscience.   
  
Each element of this line of argument deserves more detailed examination.  In the industrialized world, the 
availability of public support for scientific research is not constrained by scarcity in any absolute sense, but rather by 
competing political priorities.  In Canada, governments have made a political choice to give higher priority to other 
objectives, such as cutting taxes, and to tie available research support more closely than in the past to the needs of 
industry in a knowledge-based economy.
25
   As a result, efforts to attract foreign investment have assumed special 
importance.  Thus, Industry Canada lists among the country’s attractions for biotechnology investors not only the 
availability of research support through a variety of federal programs, but also the concentration of patient populations 
in fourteen major urban catchment areas and a patient base that is “multi-ethnic, with significant pockets of founder 
population groupings,” as well as the pending streamlining of clinical trial regulations.26 
  
As an empirical observation, the point about what investors will and won’t do is probably accurate, as far as 
it goes.   This is why balancing the need to offer returns to investors against many other legitimate goals and 
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expectations represents a complex ethical and policy challenge.  However, just as the level and direction of public 
support for research is a matter of political choice, so commercialization of advances in the life sciences that offer 
genuine health benefits need not be contingent solely on the anticipation of adequate profitability.  For example, public 
or non-profit institutions that would have the option to forgo market rates of return in order to achieve the social 
benefit of broader access to important tests and therapies are not a priori implausible, although their compatibility 
with the current generation of trade agreements may be open to question.  Canada had such an institution (Connaught 
Laboratories, established by the University of Toronto in 1914), until it was sold to France’s Institut Mérieux in 1989 
by the Government of Canada, which had purchased it from the university.  Subsequent changes of ownership enabled 
the transnational pharmaceutical giant Aventis to (in Aventis’ own words) “become the world leader in vaccines.”  
When publicly funded advances in genomics research offer genuine health benefits, the option of production for the 
public interest rather than solely for private profit may become especially attractive. 
  
The strength of IP protection may be an important ingredient in a country’s ability to attract life scientists and 
the private funds to support them, but especially in Canada and other countries whose domestic markets are relatively 
small, we must ask why this should be so.  Wherever research is carried out, the important health care markets now and 
in the near future will be the United States and the European Union (EU), so those are the jurisdictions where patent 
protection is most important for commercial purposes. Likewise, the location of development and manufacturing 
would seem to owe at least as much to geography and other aspects of the business environment as to the local 
availability of patent protection.  Ownership of capital has always given investors substantial leverage with respect to 
national and subnational governments.
28
   The removal of many barriers to cross-border trade and investment flows 
(‘globalization’) has enhanced that leverage in a way that one commentator describes as “a return to property-based 
voting rights, but on an international scale.”29  It seems likely that large corporations, in particular, use the choice of 
where to finance and locate their research activities as a form of  “job blackmail”30 aimed at securing favourable 
policies from national governments not only in IP but also in a variety of other areas.  This point was implicitly 
conceded by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC), an advisory body appointed by Cabinet, 
when it noted that: “Canada may suffer economically if it does not follow its major trading partners (United States, 
European Union countries and Japan) in permitting patents on higher life forms ... This difference with its major 
trading partners may create the impression that Canada is unfriendly toward biotechnology, thus impeding 
international investment in Canada’s biotechnology industry. While this latter concern relates more to Canada’s 
business reputation than to patent law, it is a relevant consideration in determining Canada’s patent policy.”31  
  
CBAC’s observation leads to the question of whether biopatenting policy is primarily about better health 
through research, or about other things.  Evidence is accumulating that the breadth and proliferation of recent 
biopatents threatens both health research and clinical practice.  Uncertainty about the legal reach of ‘upstream’ patents 
means that prudent researchers (or researchers who report to risk-averse senior managers) must locate and negotiate 
with multiple patent holders, and patent provisions may restrict access to the very advances that are used by the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries to illustrate the glowing promise of their activities.
32,33,34 
  The temporary 
monopoly provided by a patent enables its holders (a category that may include the inventors themselves, the research 
institutions that employ them and the firms to which the patent is licensed) to charge what the market will bear.  This 
may not be problematic in the case of a new kind of fuel injector or furnace.  However, the high price that patents on 
the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 genes enable Myriad Genetics, Inc. to charge for its test of hereditary susceptibility to breast 
cancer,
35,36
 and the reduced availability of hemochromatosis testing in the United States because of patent concerns,
37  
are almost certainly early warnings of multiple controversies to come.  For example, a recent report for the Ontario 
Ministry of Health observed that “the patenting of stem cells may well mean that exclusive royalty fees will have to be 
paid in the future for replacement organs and tissues developed in this manner.”38  For all but the most zealous 
enthusiasts of unrestricted markets, such prospects raise questions about when public policy may legitimately limit 
economic returns to inventors and investors, in order to shift the terms of the social contract represented by the grant of 
a patent in favour of access to knowledge and products that may save lives. 
  
A more basic uncertainty involves the link between innovation – the Canadian policy buzzword of choice 
with respect to research support – and health benefits.   Does the fact that a new product is successful in the health care 
marketplace mean that the research that produced it was the best use of available resources?   Quite apart from issues 
of distributive justice raised by the fact that the weight of one’s ‘vote’ in the marketplace is directly proportional to the 
size of one’s wallet, identifying the most worthwhile research by looking for the most successful products ignores the 
potential for market failure in cases where not all the benefits from health research can be privately marketed  (such 
benefits, in the terminology of economics, represent ‘positive externalities’).   As a rule, neither research on the 
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determinants of health nor the refinement and replication of interventions to alter those determinants generates a 
product or service that can be packaged and sold.  Little evidence exists that, on a society-wide basis, focusing public 
sector research support on areas with commercial potential will yield more substantial health benefits per dollar than 
(for example) expenditures on improving our already considerable understanding of the social determinants of health.  
For that matter, little evidence exists to support choices about the appropriate tradeoffs between investing in any form 
of research and investing in interventions that make use of the existing knowledge base to improve the determinants of 
health at the population level.  Those interventions might, for instance, aim at preventing injuries, controlling tobacco 
use, or turning the tide of obesity that now alarms researchers because of its longer term implications for population 
health and health care costs.
39,40
   
 
The analytical problem is that in most cases, this question cannot be answered reliably until after the fact.  
The political problems are far more constraining.  The quest for high-tech solutions is congruent not only with what 
might be called the ‘gladiator’ model of health care, which emphasizes the heroic battle against diseases with clearly 
identifiable victims, but also with the building of profitable businesses.  If the primary objective of health research 
expenditure is to maximize population health benefits, Canada and the United States may well be allocating too much 
of their societies’ total resources to life sciences research that is motivated by the anticipation of commercially 
valuable results.  They are probably not over-investing in such research if the primary objective is to create and sustain 
a profitable industry, but that objective may or may not have much to do with maximizing health: private returns and 
social returns are not at all the same thing.   
 
This misallocation may become more serious as the role of private research financing continues to expand.  
Conversely, our societies are almost certainly under-investing in preventive interventions with a high probability of 
effectiveness.
41   
Indeed, the current scope and reach of biopatents may create substantial impediments to research on 
preventing illness, at least in the absence of much clearer research exemptions.
42,43,44
   An equally disturbing longer 
term prospect is that institutionalizing the link between research funds and commercial opportunities will mean that 
researchers whose areas of interest have modest commercial possibilities are cut off from the most important sources 
of research support.  Ultimately, they may be screened out of research institutions and careers altogether.  Social 
scientific investigation of whether this is already happening should be undertaken with some urgency. 
 
 
Commercialization and biopatenting in a global context    
 
If the link between health benefits and commercializable research is questionable when considered within the 
boundaries of the rich countries, it is fragile in the extreme when considered in a global context.   Any serious 
discussion of sharing benefits from scientific research on a global scale must therefore begin from the fact that in the 
world as it is now, some people’s lives are worth vastly less than others’, based on the resources that are available to 
protect their health.  Roughly half the world’s population lives on less than US$2 a day,45   and the least developed 
countries spend an average of US$11 per person per year on health (public and private expenditures combined).
46  
Markets simply do not work very well for the poor when it comes to health, or anything else.
 
  
Global inequalities of income and wealth have three sets of implications for benefit sharing.  The first has to 
do with the general consequences of IP protection for economic development.
47
  “Many of today’s advanced 
economies refused to grant patents throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, or found legal and illegal ways of 
circumventing them” even as they used various stratagems to limit industrial competitors’ access to their technologies. 
48
 
  
However those same economies, led by a United States determined to protect the technological lead of its 
information technology and pharmaceutical industries,
49,50  
 have now entrenched harmonization of IP protection 
across industrialized and developing countries in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) 
Agreement.
51
   The TRIPs Agreement,  which emerged from the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations that 
also resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), appears to provide a ‘level playing field’ for rich 
and poor countries.  However, the industrialized economies have a tremendous head start in almost every scientific 
field, and they are of course dramatically richer than the rest of the world.
52,53     
 
Second, harmonized IP protection has important implications for access to health care. The authors of the 
year 2000 United Nations Human Development Report provocatively concluded that TRIPs may conflict with 
international human rights agreements that recognize the right to share in scientific progress, because it “dramatically 
reduces the possibilities for local companies to produce cheaper versions of important life-saving drugs.”54 The ethical 
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implications of interaction between IP protection and economic disparity were highlighted in the recent, and complex, 
controversy over the pricing of patent-protected antiretroviral drugs for treating HIV infection in poor countries.
55
  An 
intensive international campaign by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) eventually led a coalition of 
pharmaceutical firms, which had strong support from the US government, to abandon legal action claiming that 
provisions of a law aimed at reducing the costs of essential drugs were contrary not only to TRIPs but also to the 
property rights provisions of the South African constitution.
56,57   
The positions taken by industry and government are 
beyond dispute, although it can plausibly be argued that with respect to sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, patent 
protection actually represents a less significant obstacle to access to essential medicines than more basic issues of 
finance and infrastructure.
58
   
 
The NGO campaigns contributed to an important statement (the so-called Doha Declaration) from the 2001 
WTO Ministerial Conference, which acknowledged the need for “flexibility” on IP issues in such cases.59,60,61  What 
TRIPs actually requires and permits national governments to do when balancing patent protection and public health 
will only be known as conflicts either wend their way through the WTO dispute settlement process or are negotiated 
outside it.  Thus, the controversy over pricing and production of antiretrovirals may be repeated with respect to any 
number of patented findings from genomics research, if those findings are relevant to diseases that affect rich and poor 
alike.  HIV-AIDS is such a disease; some of its victims in the rich world offer an attractive market and possess a 
degree of political sophistication that probably gives them influence out of proportion to their numbers.  That is why 
the antiretroviral therapies that became the focus of controversy became available in the first place.  No comparable 
populations suffer from trypanosomiasis, schistosomiasis, or malaria. 
  
Thus, we come to a third set of implications for benefit sharing.  The underfunding of lines of research that 
are promising in terms of their health implications, but are unlikely to be commercially important, has especially 
serious implications for the developing world.  On a global scale “money talks louder than need” in setting priorities 
for scientific research.
62
   People working in the field of international health are familiar with the so-called  90/10 
divide in health research, in which more than 90 percent of global health research expenditure is directed toward 
diseases that affect the richest 10 percent, or less, of the world’s population.63,64  The reason is simple: in a 
profit-driven research environment, the poor lack the market power that would promise attractive potential returns on 
investment, so diseases that afflict them are neglected.
64,66,67
   
  
Administratively feasible policy measures to address the 90/10 gap can be devised, as the Global Forum on 
Health
68
 is now trying to do.   Especially creative is the proposal that potential contributions to health in the developing 
world should be one of the criteria used by granting councils in setting funding priorities and ranking individual 
applications.
69
  Such measures are necessary to address issues of distributive justice at the global level, but they will 
not be sufficient given current distributions of income and wealth.   A recent review of drug development over the past 
quarter-century found that only 16 of 1393 new compounds that had received regulatory approval were for diseases of 
the poor (tropical diseases and tuberculosis), and noted:  “Although substantial advances in molecular biology and 
pathophysiology have been made—including the ongoing genome sequencing of the parasites that cause malaria, 
leishmaniasis, and African trypanosomiasis—these advances are not translating into new products directed at the 
needs of patients.  More is known and published on the biology of leishmania and trypanosomes than any other 
parasite, yet virtually no products result from this wealth of knowledge.”70   The basic problem remains that of 
insufficient market power.  Exercises like a recent effort to identify the ‘top ten’ biotechnologies with the potential to 
improve health in developing countries
71
 are of limited value if they do not directly confront this problem ... and the 
(unsupported) claim in the summary report of this study that “[e]nforcement of intellectual property rights will be 
crucial to the affordability of these technologies”72 borders on the bizarre.  The most immediate need in international 
health, clearly identified by the director-general of the World Health Organization and confirmed by WHO’s 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, is for a several-fold increase in the resources that are available to 
provide access to basic health care and public health interventions that are available today.
73,74 
  
 
 
Whither benefit sharing?  The enclosure analogy and the possibilities for ethics 
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Fortunately, the position that biopatenting is ethically neutral
75
 now has fewer adherents,
76,77 
and in Canada a 
long overdue public discussion of benefit-sharing and other ethical issues may be generated by the recent Supreme 
Court decision.  In its final report on patenting higher life forms and related issues, CBAC recommended the 
development of “policies and practices that encourage the sharing of the benefits of research involving genetic 
materials,” but did not explore the range of such mechanisms in any detail.78  The report as a whole was seriously 
weakened because its draft version merely set out a taxonomy of positions on the ethics of biopatenting, but its authors 
did not describe and evaluate the arguments underlying those positions.
79
  Perhaps predictably, the final report 
concluded that most “social and ethical concerns” (an interesting portmanteau category) were best dealt with outside 
the Patent Act.   Two important exceptions, which have not so far been acted upon, involve the report’s 
recommendations for a clarified research and experimental use exemption and the establishment of a time-limited 
opposition procedure for challenging the validity of a patent.
80 
 
  
A report prepared for Ontario’s Ministry of Health on behalf of Canadian provincial governments, which are 
concerned not only with attracting industry to their jurisdictions but also about the implications for health care costs in 
Canada`s system of public health insurance, was much more emphatic about the need for policy attention to the cost 
and distributional consequences of biopatenting.
81 
  It called for amendments to the Patent Act not only to limit the 
scope of biopatents when they involve diagnostic tests and therapies, but also to provide for compulsory licensing of 
genetic diagnostic and screening tests.  Ontario’s Ministry of Health has, in fact, rejected Myriad Genetics’ demand 
that the province’s hospitals stop providing (at much lower cost) predictive genetic tests that, according to Myriad, are 
covered by its patents.
82,83 
   
  
Otherwise, little action has occurred in response to the federal and Ontario reports, or to numerous proposals 
from other sources.  These proposals include an ethics review process (a “moral tollbooth”) that would operate in 
parallel with patent examination, although the proposal focuses on the form rather than the content of ethics review.
84
  
Ethics review might include ‘upstream requirements’ having to do, for example, with how biological materials were 
obtained in the research leading to the innovation for which a patent is sought.
85
   In order to address issues of 
distributive justice in the pricing of patented tests and therapies, the idea has been mooted of a mandated patent 
licensing society that would make gene inventions available to all users at a fixed royalty rate
86
 – a form of compulsory 
licensing broader than that envisioned in the Ontario report. 
 
For purposes of the research ethics approval that is critical to research in university settings, distributive 
justice and benefit sharing as they relate to biopatenting remain effectively off limits.  A joint policy of the three 
federal granting councils
87 
(the Tri-Council Policy Statement) provides a framework for ethics review of research 
supported by the councils.  The review is conducted by research ethics boards (REBs) appointed by the managements 
of individual research institutions; review of research that receives no such financing is at the discretion of institutions 
and sponsors.  The section of an earlier draft of the Policy Statement that addressed benefit sharing, specifying that 
“researchers and REBs [research ethics boards] must endeavor to distribute equitably the potential benefits of 
research,”88 was removed from the policy by the granting councils before its adoption.   The policy specifies that 
potential conflicts of interest arising from possible financial benefit to researchers must be disclosed to research 
subjects.  It otherwise provides no basis for ethics review of the content of IP arrangements that may exist among 
researchers, institutions and sponsors; the substantive portions of the policy make only one reference to IP, dealing 
with the specialized issue of implanted medical devices.   When I have suggested at conferences that the substance of 
such arrangements is a legitimate topic for ethics review, the idea has been met with incredulity.  
  
On the broader ethical implications of the expanding role of commercial priorities in Canada’s health science 
research agenda, silence reigns.  This may change as a result of the decision by CIHR to participate in a multi-agency 
Global Health Research Initiative.  If the participants in this initiative take seriously the real prerequisites for 
improving population health on a global scale, the result could be a genuine effort to incorporate potential health 
benefits outside the borders of the industrialized world into funding criteria.  Over the longer term, this  initiative could 
in turn lead to more general debate about the ethical implications of the links between science and business that are 
exemplified by Canadian genomics research.  Where and how this questioning might take place remains uncertain.  To 
date, biotechnology policy has been dominated by the executive branch of the national government, including 
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agencies like CBAC and the granting councils.  Lacking, it seems, is a “public square” in which an informed and 
critical debate could occur.
89
 
  
Opponents of biopatenting, and of the commercial biotechnology enterprise as a whole, sometimes draw an 
analogy with the enclosures and extinguishment of customary rights that transformed the pattern of English 
agriculture and landholding in the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth.
90,91,92
  One consequence was to enrich 
the landholding few while creating tremendous hardship for the many who depended on access to common lands and 
on the resources provided by such practices as gleaning (collecting grain left behind after the harvest).
93,94
   The 
enclosure analogy is most clearly appropriate when applied not to biopatents that are directly related to human health, 
but rather to crop plants developed from genetic material obtained in developing countries access to which is then, in 
effect, sold back to people in the country of origin at premium prices.
95,96
   Despite its limitations, the analogy is useful 
and provocative for at least two reasons. 
  
First, biopatenting, like the enclosure movement, involves the reshaping of law to define and defend forms of 
property that are newly valuable, or perhaps only conceivable, as a result of advances in science and technology.  
Yesterday, those advances involved new techniques of farming (such as the continuous rotation of crops), stock 
breeding, textile production (thus altering the relative returns from crop and pasture land) and land improvement.  
Today, they are exemplified by the isolation and purification of human genes.  Genomics-based industry, in turn 
represents just one element of an emerging complex of knowledge based industries, and biopatenting may best be 
understood as part of a more comprehensive redefinition of intellectual property rights that is actually more familiar 
from the reinterpretation and extension of copyright protection for the digital age.
97
    
  
Second, whatever ethical reflection and on-the-ground resistance may have been associated with enclosures, 
both were relentlessly swept aside as law and policy responded to the demands of the powerful.  Perhaps a similar 
pattern will emerge in the case of biopatenting, and in other areas of law related to the success of bioscience-based 
industries.  This is the hyper-realist position taken by the author of a recent article on the regulation of genetic 
research, who concluded that:  “Industrial strategy, both on the national and international level, will not be arrested by 
moral difficulties.” 98   Concerns about biopatenting underscore the need for Canada to develop policies and 
institutions that reconcile the need to build internationally viable knowledge-based industries with explicit attention to 
“moral difficulties” and the appropriate role of commercial considerations both within and across national borders.   
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